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    BIOSECURITY AND PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal Abstract The biological threats have been arising from both natural and man-made pathogens. Indeed, the dual-use characteristic of biological research increases the chances of its misuse. The biological research dissemination, however, could not be banned because of the immense use of biological agents in human medicines, veterinary prosperity, and agriculture productivity. The benevolent and malevolent use of biological sciences intensifies the significance of Biosecurity. Despite its importance, Biosecurity receives inconsequential attention in Pakistan. The focus on Biosecurity in Pakistan is not much different from other developing countries. The people of Pakistan are vulnerable to Biosecurity related challenges. The complex nature of Biosecurity challenges and underscores that no nation and no institution is capable to deal with them on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities of like Introduction The revolution in biological-sciences and biological- technology signifies Biosecurity in the twenty-first century. 1 Biosecurity is often interchangeably used or confused with Bio-safety. The concepts of Bio-safety and Biosecurity deal with related, but distinctly different puzzles. Bio-safety is a well-established concept with a widely-accepted meaning and international guidance on how it is put into practice at the national level. 2 The Bio-safety measures aim to prevent the unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. 3 The term Biosecurity is a comparatively new one, and thereby its’ concept has been evolving. Since 2003, in the setting of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 2 Convention (BTWC), Biosecurity has most commonly been used to refer to the mechanisms that establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms, toxins and relevant resources. 4 Hence, Biosecurity protects germs from people. And its measures focus on the prevention of theft, misuse, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins. 5 Today, however, the Biosecurity scope is broader than the BTWC delineation. The impressive advancements in biotechnology or rapid advances in genetic engineering and the study of pathogenesis (the molecular mechanisms by which microbes cause disease) alarm that terrorists’ could be able to create “improved” bio- warfare agents for their nefarious objectives. The ability of scientists to produce life from scratch provides an option to the terrorist group to synthesize deadly pathogens having greater lethality, environmental stability, difficulty of detection, and resistance to existing drugs and vaccines. Jonathan B. Tucker pointed out: “The efficient dispersal of a few kilograms of a biological agent, such as the dried spores of the anthrax bacterium, over a troop concentration or a major city could sicken or kill many thousands of people.” 6 Tucker’s anxiety about biological agents was shared by numerous security observers, who believed that “Biotechnology is one of the two technologies that truly deserve the label ‘agent of mass destruction’ and it is by far the more accessible of the two.” 7 Tucker also pointed out that: “the limited quantities of biological agent required for a devastating attack could be produced with small-scale equipment, occupying perhaps only a single room, and nearly all such equipment is dual-use and available throughout the world.” 8 The dual-use phenomenon added a subverting variable in the Biosecurity. In simple words, a scientists or laboratory technician can steal a small quantity of dangerous pathogens and use it to develop biological weapon himself or pass it onto a terrorist group for monetary or even ideological reasons. 9 Although, the bioterrorism centralized Biosecurity debate, especially after the anthrax use in fall 2001, yet it has kept the discourse within the traditional security paradigm. The Severe Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 3 Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) contagion in 2002- 2003, 10 Influenza A virus epidemic of 2006 (avian influenza), 2007 Equine influenza, 2009 Swine flu and again the Swine flu pandemic outbreak in India in December 2014, 11 have alarmed security analysts. Consequently, Biosecurity has emerged as an important area of investigation for the Human Security analysts in the developed world. Conversely, bioterrorism, emerging diseases (SARS) or reemerging infectious disease (tuberculosis, plague) and pandemic flu strains, which are all within the context of rapid global travel, have failed to draw serious response in the developing states. The focus on Biosecurity in Pakistan is not much different from the other developing states. The people of Pakistan are vulnerable to the Biosecurity related challenges. It was reported that on April 14, 2015, a 57-year-old man died in Lahore after allegedly contracting swine flu. 12 On May 8, 2015, a person died in Islamabad due to Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). 13 Three deaths caused by Naegleria fowleri, commonly known as the ‘brain-eating’ amoeba, in Karachi during the first half of 2015. 14 Around 500 camels infected by ‘mysterious disease’ in Noorpur Thal (District Khushab-Punjab) and adjoining areas in May 2015. 15 Despite the government of Pakistan’s serious efforts, Polio remains endemic disease in the country. 16 Today, “Pakistan is far away from target set by WHO and we failed to completely eradicate polio from Pakistan. 17 According to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), four sanctuaries for the polio virus exist in Pakistan, i.e. Quetta, the districts of Qila Abdullah and Pishin and Karachi. 18 The mosquito borne diseases are common in Pakistan. For example, in 2011, Dengue caused havoc in Lahore. 19 The foot- and-mouth (FMD—a pathogen of cattle and other ungulates) disease is very common in the rural areas of Pakistan. 20 The common man live stocks in the rural areas of the country suffered immensely from this disease. Similarly, Pakistani agriculture sector, especially citrus and mango growing regions are sufferer of diseases affecting the trees and plants. The citrus greening, caused by the bacteria Liberibacter Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 4 asiaticus 21 takes its toll on the productivity of the citrus. The mango growers’ economy severely affected during the recent years, especially in District Multan and Sind province. The repetition of the diseases reflects the poor management of Biosecurity in Pakistan. The objective of this study is to critically examine the Biosecurity’s puzzles. The key research questions are: What is meant by Biosecurity? What is the Spectrum of the Biosecurity threat? What are the alarming facts? What is the situation in Pakistan? The answers of these questions assist us in chalking out the appropriate countermeasures to redress the Biosecurity challenges in the twenty-first century. The first section contains discussion on the theoretical contextualization. It is followed by securitization of Biosecurity phenomenon. The third section briefly highlights the spectrum of biological threats. The fourth section deliberates about Pakistan and Biosecurity. The fifth section contains discussion on the Biosecurity related challenges to Pakistan. The final section contains countermeasures. Theoretical Contextualization The Traditional and Non-Traditional security theorists have been critically examining the significant issues like bio- risks, bio-safety, and bio-security that impinge on daily human existence and welfare. In the traditional security paradigm, the BTWC prevents biological warfare and the deliberate use of disease as a weapon. The Convention, however, has failed to eradicate the stocks of Biological weapons completely, because of the absence of verification and enforcement mechanism. The Convention also could not dissuade the use of Biological agents by the local, national and international terrorist groups for their nefarious objectives in the prevailing asymmetrical warfare. The Non-Traditional Security school of thought warned that the entire world has been gradually inching towards bio- insecurity. While discussing current non-traditional security threats, Mely Caballero-Anthony pointed out: “Aside from Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 5 being non-military in nature, these challenges share other common characteristics: they are transnational in scope (neither purely domestic nor purely inter-state); they arise at very short notice and are transmitted rapidly as a result of globalization and the communication revolution; they cannot be prevented entirely, but can be mitigated through coping mechanisms; national solutions are often inadequate, and thus regional and multilateral cooperation is essential; and finally, the object of security is no longer just the state (state sovereignty and territorial integrity) but also the people — their survival, well-being and dignity, at both individual and societal level.” 22 This understanding of non-traditional security challenges underscores that infectious disease, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the H5N1- Bird flu virus, etc, have the capacity to detrimentally affect national security. The non-traditional security theorists also pointed out that Biosecurity of a state is very much vulnerable to the atmospheric changes due to natural calamity and man-made environmental degrading agents and population growth. The state’s national policies for food security and scientific inventions for the comfortability of citizens have serious repercussions for global atmospheric system. In spite of this, people have non-serious approach towards Biosecurity and therefore, the link between combating biological weapons and combating infectious diseases has not yet been established. This raises a question: how real is the threat? More precisely, demographic change, climate change, economic growth and the rising demand for resources have all posed serious threat to Biosecurity. Hence, there is a need to prevent, deter and deal with the threat of Biosecurity. Securitization of Biosecurity The rise of Non-Traditional security concept and asymmetric warfare pattern in the inter-state and intra-state theaters have signified Biosecurity puzzle in the post-Cold War security calculus. 23 Laura A. Meyerson and Jamie K. Reaser argued that: “Imported goods and animals can harbor Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 6 undetected species such as microbial pathogens, arthropods, or plant seeds with the potential to become invasive and cause significant harm.” 24 The U.S. anthrax attacks in 2001 and revelations about al Qaeda’s attempts to develop a Biological Weapons (BW) program alarmed the policymakers, particularly Bush Administration in the United States about the Biosecurity imbroglio. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks argued: “Even before the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, there was a growing understanding within the security and global health communities that pathogens pose a threat equal to, if not greater than, military might. Biological weapons offer a relatively inexpensive and surreptitious method of inflicting mass casualties.” 25 Notwithstanding, the term Biosecurity was originally used to describe an approach designed to prevent or decrease the spread of naturally occurring infectious diseases and pests in crops and livestock. The approach’s primary concern was the threats to animal and plant health and to biodiversity, which might have an indirect impact on human health, but not direct effect. More precisely, in veterinary and agricultural fields the term denoted protecting biological resources from foreign or invasive species. In the late 1990s, the threat of bioterrorism gave a new definition to Biosecurity. In this context, Biosecurity is defined as “the protection of microbial (bacteria causing diseases) agents from loss, theft, diversion or intentional use.” 26 During the last decade, the scholars having multidisciplinary background had intensively debated the concept of Biosecurity. The primary objective of the debate was to ensure the physical security of a designated list of dangerous pathogens. Consequently, Biosecurity definition has become more explicit and its focus has been broadened. 27 Since, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) conclusion (in August 2008) that Bruce Ivins, a scientist at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), was the sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax letters attack, greater attention has been paid to ensure the reliability of personnel with access to microbial agents. 28 Bruce Ivins terrorism act had further intensified the significance of both protection of microbial and dual-use Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 7 biotechnology from scientists’ intentional misuse. This introduced a comprehensive perspective of Biosecurity. For instance, the United States National Academy of Science defined Biosecurity as: “security against the inadvertent, inappropriate, or intentional malicious or malevolent use of potentially dangerous biological agents or biotechnology, including the development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons as well as outbreaks of newly emergent and epidemic disease.” 29 While discussion the National Academy of Science definition of Biosecurity Gregory D. Koblentz pointed out that: “This definition is characterized by the inclusion of both deliberate and natural sources of disease outbreaks, the threats posed by pathogens as well as biotechnology, and the vulnerability of humans, plants, and animals to biological threats.” 30 This understanding of Biosecurity necessitated the protection of germs from people. So that; an individual or a group could not steal, misuse, or intentional release the pathogens and toxins. 31 The Americans realization of the intensity of biological related threats contributed positively in the Biosecurity debate. In the aftermath of 2001 Anthrax letter attacks, the Biosecurity has become one of the primary security concerns in the United States. Its’ National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity while keeping in consideration the oversight of dual-use research, warned that a “biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security.” 32 It has broadened the scope of Biosecurity beyond the pathogenic organisms that were the focus of previous definitions to include techniques and technologies that can be used to create new pathogenic organisms or biologically active compounds. Although dual-use characteristic of biological research increases the chances of misuse, yet its dissemination cannot be prohibited due to the use of biological agents in human medicine, veterinary prosperity, and agriculture productivity. Moreover, under the Article I of the BTWC States Parties are authorized to acquire and manipulate pathogens for Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 8 protective, prophylactic (refers activities related to the protection of the human body from the effects of organisms or substances to which an individual might be directly exposed) and other peaceful purposes. Such activities include biological defense programs. The dissemination and legitimate biological defense programs increase the probability of biological attacks; boost emergence and re-emergence of biological diseases, and also make difficult to distinguish legitimate from illicit research and development activities. Though, the Australia Group controls or limits the export of materials and technologies relevant to the production of chemical and biological weapons to proliferant countries as well as non-state actors, such as terrorists, 33 yet this control apparatus is inconclusive. The dual-use biological equipment-items that can be used for both peaceful research and biological weapons production, and the global expansion of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors undermine the effectiveness of Australia Group export controls mechanism. Realizing the loopholes in Australia Group controlling system; the United States executed ‘Patriot Act of 2001 and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002’, which criminalized the unauthorized possession, use, or transfer of the forty-nine biological agents or toxins listed by HHS. Individuals working with these agents must register with HHS and institute access controls, handling and reporting requirements, and personnel screening for their laboratories. 34 Despite these arrangements; Biosecurity remains vulnerable to acute risks. The dual applications of Chimeric Organism, Synthetic Biology, Synthetic Genomics, Molecular Biology, Bioregulators, and Genomic sciences or the “new biology” could be misused to undermine Biosecurity. Spectrum of Biological Threats The preceding section underscores the biological threats arising from natural or man-made pathogen. It identifies factors that pose challenge to Biosecurity and draws our attention to the reality that there is a broad array of biological Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 9 threats, natural as well as deliberate. It marked the risk that misuse of the life sciences could result in the deliberate or inadvertent release of biological material in a manner that sickens or kills people, animals, or plants, or renders unusable critical resources. The following table explains the spectrum of biological risks, ranging from natural occurring factious disease to deliberate use of disease as a weapon. Spectrum of Biological Threats Naturally occurring diseases Resurrect infectious diseases Unintended consequences of research Laboratory incidents Lack of awareness Negligence Deliberate misuse Source: Terence Taylor, “Safeguarding Advances in the Life Sciences,” EMBO Reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (July 2006), p. S61.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1490302 /pdf/7400725.pdf, accessed on September 15, 2010. Biosecurity and Pakistan Pakistan has developed a modest bioscience and biotechnological infrastructure. It is a debatable variable that whether or not Islamabad is sensitive to the gravity of Biosecurity challenges. Nevertheless, Islamabad has taken a few constructive measures, which generate impression that the Government of Pakistan has not entirely insensitive to the Biosecurity quandary. For instance, Pakistan is party to BTWC and Convention on Biodiversity. It is signatory to the 2001 Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity, 35 and had promulgated a national legislation entitled, Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004 in September 2004. 36 In addition, the National Institute of Health (NIH) located at Islamabad regularly refurbishes guidelines and monitors research in life sciences to protect Pakistani citizens from any precarious use of dangerous pathogens. Its public health strategy has been focusing on the eradication of microbes by using powerful medical weaponry, i.e. antibiotics, anti-malarias vaccines, etc. On June 22, 2005, Ambassador Masood Khan, Pakistan’s permanent Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 10 representative at Geneva claimed at the Meeting of Experts to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction that Pakistan had adopted following measures for the protection of human beings, animals and plants:  It developed an elaborate system, supported by 2,000 reporting stations, for early detection and surveillance of diseases.  Its National Bio-safety guidelines covering laboratories, research field studies and commercial release of (GMOs) Genetically Modified Organisms and products thereof - were approved in May 2005. These guidelines have the support of the academic institutions, R & D organizations, NGOs, and industry and are in conformity with UNIDO, FAO, WHO, and UNEP guidelines duly adapted to Pakistani socio-economic and geographical environment.  The National Institute of Health (NIH) developed and implemented a code of conduct in accordance with the International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the World Health Assembly.  A Bio-safety Committee has been set up to monitor the research and development activities in life sciences and ensures that the conduct of the scientists in consonance with the provisions of the BTWC.  Faculties and students of leading universities and research institutions have been sensitized of their responsibilities for Bio-safety and Biosecurity. The premier institutions have been encouraged to develop their own codes of conduct.  In September 2004, Pakistan enacted an Act of Parliament to control export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons. 37 The preceding discussion generates impression that Islamabad is very much responsive to the Biosecurity and Bio- safety problems. In reality, these arrangements have Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 11 constructive effect in the realm of Bio-safety, but have limited outcome in the sphere of Biosecurity. Importantly, Pakistan cannot get rid of infectious diseases completely because microbes and the insects, rodents, and other animals that transmit infectious diseases are in a constant state of biological flux and evolution. Secondly, dual-use biological agents are regularly used in the Pakistani laboratories ranging from those in colleges and universities to more advanced national institutions and the research and development facilities run by pharmaceutical companies. Thirdly, it has a less developed health-care infrastructures, especially in the rural areas. It is an open secret that pharmaceutical availability is restricted to urban centers. Whereas, majority of the Pakistanis reside in rural areas, and thereby medical care is unavailable to a larger section of the population/society in the country. Above all, the people have intimidating indifference to the Biosecurity. Pakistan: Intimidating Indifference Pakistan today, is countering both interstate and intrastate security challenges. Since 9/11, its Federal Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) has become the epicenter of the transnational terrorist organizations, to be called “Terrorist Syndicate led by al Qaeda”, nefarious activities. 38 These organizations successfully established their links with the local (Pakistani) terrorist groups and thereby successfully conducted acts of terrorism in the urban centers of Pakistan. The armed forces of Pakistan launched operation Zerb-e-Azb in June 2015 and successfully destroyed the terrorist sanctuaries located in Tribal Agencies, especially North Waziristan. 39 Conversely, the Biosecurity makes faint scratches on the minds of the Pakistani security observers. There is hardly any reference to Biosecurity in the Pakistani electronic and print media. Even the international meetings of public health and law enforcement officials, which take place annually in Geneva to discuss improved capabilities for responding to an attack with biological weapons and outbreaks of infectious diseases, remained unnoticed in the Pakistani media. Moreover, Biosecurity has also failed to Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 12 attract the attention of the Pakistani social scientists in their academic discourse as well as in literature produced by security analysts’ on National Security of Pakistan. 40 Admittedly, a few Pakistani biologists enthusiastically have been campaigning to create awareness about both the Biosecurity puzzles and preventive apparatus of Bio-safety. 41 Similarly, a few organizations have been working for the environmental sustainability. The natural scientists campaign, certainly, maximize the awareness and efficacy of the Bio- safety practices and kit. It could not be an alternative to the social scientists realization and articulation of Biosecurity phenomenon. Hence, the initiation of Biosecurity puzzle discourse among the Pakistani social scientists is imperative. Although, Pakistan’s geostrategic environment has germinated a vibrant security debate in the country, yet an absence of deliberation on Biosecurity warrants a serious attention. What are the causes of this apathetic attitude towards Biosecurity in Pakistan? Hypothetically, three factors seem responsible for this apathetic attitude: First, both India and Pakistan are parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. That is why; the Pakistani strategic pundits are not deliberating the threat of an attack with biological weapons and outbreaks of infectious diseases. Similarly, the military planners of Pakistan are least concerned about biological weapons as well as Biosecurity challenges. Second, the Tehrik-i-Taliban and al Qaeda attacks in Pakistan, regardless of their enormous impact, were conventional in nature till the writing of these lines. A suicidal attack with a Biological device would have had much more of devastating effect than their attacks with conventional devices in densely populated centers of Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta. The absence of the biological terrorism’s precedent provides luxury to the civil law enforcement agencies in Pakistan to ignore the Biosecurity related threats till the small parcel containing a small amount of deadly anthrax spores reached in the Prime Minister secretariat at Islamabad in October 2011. 42 Third, although a few American security analysts had highlighted the challenges of Biosecurity in the twenty-first century, yet scarcity of deliberation on the Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 13 subject continues at both global and domestic levels, including Pakistan. On July 22, 2012, Talat Naseer Pasha (Vice Chancellor of the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, Lahore) stated that: “No Biosecurity rules exist in the country.” 43 Hence, both government agencies and civil society do not comprehend the intensity of infectious pathogens threat to human beings, live-stoke industry and valuable crops in the globalized world. Moreover, the developed world’s donor agencies, which provide mega financial support to the non-governmental organizations or civil society activists in Pakistan to create awareness and devise countermeasures to the non-traditional security threats, are not forthcoming in Biosecurity realm. The military planners’ indifference towards Biosecurity puzzle is understandable. The modern armed forces, including Pakistani armed forces, possess advanced lethal weapons than biological weapons, such as nuclear weapons. Secondly, being a party to BTWC, Pakistani armed forces are prohibited to use biological weapons. However, the civil law enforcement agencies or relevant government departments and ministries (Ministry of Interior/Health/Agriculture) casual or apathetic attitude towards Biosecurity are incomprehensible. Significantly, the disinclination of the terrorist groups to use the infectious pathogens in their terrorist attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere has generated a misguided impression about the comprehensiveness of Biosecurity apparatus in the country. We have fortunately not seen our worst fears become reality. The objective analysis, however, underscores that Biological Weapons, presently, lack significance in the terrorist’s strategy and tactics. Simultaneously, we don’t have even a hint of the level of bioscientific-biotechnical capability of transnational terrorist organization possess. Realistically, nothing can guarantee that ideologically motivated and manifestly ruthless terrorist groups will not use biological agents for maximizing their attacks’ impact in the densely populated centers of Pakistan. In addition, the biological weapons might be used by the terrorists to cause large-scale Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 14 damage to our agriculture and live-stock industry by killing economically valuable crops and animals. The following are a few factors which need serious attention of both the state and society because they could contribute negatively to the Biosecurity apparatus in Pakistan. Naturally Occurring Diseases Naturally occurring disease outbreaks are important source of lethal organisms. Indeed, natural out breaks are the ultimate origin of the agents historically used in nations’ biological weapons programs. For example: Avian Influenza and Zoonotic Diseases. The Influenza A virus has various sub types and is mostly found in birds – particularly wild aquatic birds. Avian influenza is highly pathogenic, which refers to its high mortality rate in poultry infections. The virus is also highly resistant to avian host immune systems, making it difficult for experts to develop vaccines to the strains, which have limited effectiveness because of the speed at which influenza evolves. In a few countries, Avian influenza also spread from bird-to-human. The avian influence has been spreading due to the increase in poultry production without improved Biosecurity measures, free range duck production and live bird markets – which may allow greater likelihood of infected birds mixing with healthy birds – and the close contact between poultry and people during the raising and slaughter of poultry. 44 Importantly, due to the bird migration, the deadly viruses spread in other parts of the world. For example, the summer 1999 outbreak of the West Nile virus in New York was caused by an infected traveler or mosquito transported from the Middle East. Later, it spread in other states of the United States. 45 Moreover, the Zoonotic diseases such as anthrax, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, cysticercosis, echinococcosis (hydatid disease) and rabies are endemic in many developing countries of Africa, Asia and South and Central America. Many of the most affected countries have poor or nonexistent veterinary public health (VPH) infrastructures. 46 In Pakistan, the poultry industry has been flourishing without any systematic government regulatory Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 15 apparatus. The increasing number of control-sheds to breed chickens in Pakistan alarms the probability of the spread of Avian influenza in the country. Resurrect of Infectious Diseases The revolutionary developments in genetics, genomics and other areas of the biomedical sciences create possibilities for the resurrection of infectious pandemic virus. For instance, in October 2005, a team of US scientists, headed by Jeffery Taubenberger from the US Armed Forces Institute of Pathology published the full sequence of the highly virulent strain of influenza virus that caused the Spanish influenza pandemic in the winter of 1918–1919 and killed up to 50 million people worldwide. The report was the paradigmatic proof to the reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus. 47 The Biological sciences maturity, especially in the area of biotechnology in Pakistan necessitates that government should adopt preventive measures to check the misuse of the genetics or genomics’ experts in the country. Unintended Consequences of Research The Biological weapons are not the only type of risk to involve biological agents. There are also inadvertent and accidental creation of micro-organisms and bioregulators that have enhanced potential for causing disease. For instance, Australian researchers had inadvertently developed a lethal mouse virus—mousepox. The results of mousepox experiment were published. It was noted that the experiment could be easily replicated and verified in independent laboratories. This information had widespread terror within the international defense and medical community. It is because smallpox and mousepox are very closely related. 48 While commenting on the mousepox, virus expert Professor John Oxford claimed that he would not have expected this result. He added: “though, that while rare, it is inevitable that unpredictable events will occur, which is why such experiments are closely monitored and performed in isolated laboratories.” 49 The creation of mousepox manifests that the Scientists can acquire potentially Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 16 deadly biological agents in the course of legitimate research. 50 Hence, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan ought to chalk out a policy, which without harming the scientific research publication prevents the crisis akin to mousepox publication. Laboratory Accidents The pathogens (including high consequence pathogens) and toxins can be found in clinical laboratories, hospitals, research universities, private industry, and numerous government facilities. Many of these facilities are easily accessible to the public. Moreover, the fermenters required to produce biological agents in large quantities are widely used in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and even beer industries. The probability of accident cannot be ruled out. The alarming factor is that if an incident (accident, inadvertent release, and deliberate release) involving a biological agent occurs; it is not possible to immediately identify what type of biological risk had caused it. It is because the biological agents are invisible and silent killers. Most of the microbes used in the research laboratories are not visible to naked eye, usually do not have any smell or taste and have incubation periods ranging from weeks to month. Moreover, the bacteria and viruses have reproducing ability and thereby microbes’ number continues multiplying after the initial dissemination. Thus, it is imperative that the industry which uses biological agents, and academic institutions having biological laboratories ought to have contingency planning and equipments to tackle the incidents that entail the release of biological agents. Lack of Awareness The results of mousepox experiment were published. It was noted that the experiment could be easily replicated and verified in independent labs. This information had widespread terror within the international defense and medical community. The scientist consulted Australian Ministry of Defence before disseminating their research finds about the Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 17 lethal mousepox virus. When they published their findings, along with a description of the materials and methods, in the Journal of Virology in 2001 ( Jackson et al, 2001), critics complained that they had thereby alerted would-be terrorists to new ways of making biological weapons and had provided them with explicit instructions. 51 The possibility of reconstruction of Spanish influenza by rogue state scientists has been increased after the publication of full sequence of the highly virulent Spanish influenza or the availability of its full genome sequence on the internet. 52 The preceding discussed incident necessitates that the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan makes it compulsory for both biologists and the scientific journals publishers in the country to consult the defence ministry before such publications. Negligence Eckard Wimmer pointed out that “Bioterrorism relies mostly on infectious agents. Defence against these agents rests principally on research aiming to limit the impact of a harmful agent through either novel drugs or new vaccines.” 53 The shocking reality is that despite the realization of Biosecurity significance, the rate of bio-defence vaccine development has not kept pace with the growing number of biological threats facing the entire international community. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks claimed that: “Of the forty-nine biological threat agents identified by the [U.S.] Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the [U.S.] Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has licensed vaccines to protect against only four agents on this list (anthrax, cholera, plague, and smallpox). Each of these vaccines was developed in the 1970s or earlier, and none is proven to protect humans against weaponized versions of these pathogens. 54 It was estimated that one needs $300 million to $1 billion and seven to ten years to bring a single vaccine to market. 55 In addition, the U.S. regulatory framework for preventing the proliferation of Biological Weapons has negatively influenced the Bio-defence research. The trial of Dr. Thomas Butler, chief of infectious diseases at Texas Tech University Medical School, terrorized the researchers working in the field of biological sciences. 56 Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 18 Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, stated, “If I had select agents in my lab, I think I'd give serious consideration in the morning as to whether I really want to do this or not.” 57 Deliberate Misuse The rapid progress in biotechnology makes possible the creation of epidemic viruses in a few days. For instance, biologist could synthesize poliovirus in a few days. 58 In the near future, for example, sophisticated terrorists might exploit gene-synthesis technology to recreate deadly viruses in the laboratory, thereby circumventing the strict controls on access to “select agents” of bioterrorism concern. 59 There is a need to prevent such a deliberate misuse of virsuses. Domestic Migration In Pakistan, humanity is on the move from rural areas to urban centers. The unchecked urban population expansion raises the statistical probability that pathogens will be transmitted, whether from person to person or vector—insect, rodent, or other—to person. As Laurie Garrett noted that: “Urbanization and global migration propel radical changes in human behavior as well as in the ecological relationship between microbes and humans. Almost invariably in large cities, sex industries arise and multiple-partner sex becomes more common, prompting rapid increases in sexually transmitted diseases. Black market access to antimicrobials is greater in urban centers, leading to overuse or outright misuse of the precious drugs and the emergence of resistant bacteria and parasites. Intravenous drug abusers’ practice of sharing syringes is a ready vehicle for the transmission of microbes. Under funded urban health facilities often become unhygienic centers for the dissemination of disease rather than its control.” 60 Hence, the megacities, like Karachi, Lahore, etc, of Pakistan are vulnerable to epidemics and unusual outbreaks of disease due to inadequate sewage and water systems, housing, and public health provisions. For instance, in the Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 19 recent year’s people in different cities of Pakistan suffered from super lethal dengue hemorrhagic fever. Dengue Fever: Intelligent Move The constructive role of the government and aid agencies to prevent the water borne diseases has increased during the recent years. They have launched an awareness campaign and warn about the likely spread of epidemics, particularly of water-borne diseases such as cholera, in the flood-stricken areas prior to the monsoon season. 61 Realizing the threat of dengue fever spread in 2012, the government took precautionary measures. On August 27, 2012, the federal government organizations, including cantonment boards and Pakistan Railways, were asked to launch anti-dengue campaigns in their jurisdictions to support the efforts of the Provincial governments to avert the dengue mosquitoes spread and prevent dengue fever outbreak. 62 The Punjab government had also taken effective measures to prevent the dengue epidemic. It announced September 2, 2012 as Anti- Dengue Day in Punjab. In Lahore, a citywide dengue awareness campaign was launched during the last week of August 2012. Since then, every year, various government departments, hospitals, schools and universities have been participating in the campaign. ‘Doctors and nurses have been trained to deal with the potential epidemic. Lahore has been festooned with anti-dengue mosquito kits, leaflets and billboards bearing necessary information on recognizing and treating the symptoms of the disease, but most importantly, how to prevent dengue mosquito breeding.’ 63 This campaign has immense dividends and thereby both the central and provincial governments have spared funds for the continuity of this campaign. Punjab Government’s Health Ministry department announced to restart the anti-dengue campaign on February15, 2015. 64 Backward Health-Facilities Being a developing state, Pakistan is lacking financial and human resources to provide adequate health facilities to its Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 20 entire population. Therefore, the detection and prevention of infectious diseases, such as Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), 65 at early stage is very remote, especially in rural areas and peripheral districts of the country. Some time one counters this problem in the advanced urban cities of Pakistan, as well. For instance, in September 2010, Rasheeda Begum, aged 35, from Village Toot, Dhoke Golguppa of Tehsil Pindigheb, Attock, was infected with Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). Neither her local hospital nor the Holy Family Hospital, Rawalpindi was able to treat her. She received proper medicinal treatment from Shifa Hospital, which is one of the costliest hospitals in Islamabad, Pakistan. It was reported that the treatment costs her from Rs 30,000 to Rs35,000 per day and the family was not in a position of retaining treatment at Shifa Hospital. 66 The National Institute of Health reported that eight employees of Holy Family Hospital suffered from CCHF. General perception was that these employs were exposed to CCHF while attending to two patients, one of whom died on September 24, 2010. On October 1, 2010, four suspected CCHF patients were hospitalised in Peshawar. The NIH had confirmed that the Congo virus was responsible for Dr. Hasnain Shah’s death in Abbottabad in early September 2010. Similar incidents reported from Karachi during the same month. For example, two persons died due to CCHF in September 2010. 67 On August 29, 2012, Abdur Razzaq from a village in the area of Choa Sayden Shah, District Chakwal died at the Holy Family Hospital due to CCHF disease. 68 Rabies is a severe viral disease caused by a virus ‘Rabdo- Virus’ carried in the saliva of infected animal and is transmitted to human beings through bites, scratches or licks even. It is fatal if not treated properly. It was reported in the newspaper on the World Rabies Day (September 28, 2010) that in most parts of Pakistan including major cities like Rawalpindi, the ideal treatment for suspected rabies patients was not available in the public sector hospitals and in primary and secondary healthcare facilities despite the fact that the disease had claimed nearly 25,000 deaths within past one decade. Dr. Shahab Akhtar Qazi, National Coordinator of Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 21 Rabies Prevention Programme at National Institute of Health, Islamabad, pointed out: “We have not been given any funds for the last three years for running prevention and awareness activities.” 69 The incapability of the government hospital to treat rabies patient was reported on August 29, 2012. It was reported that in Faisalabad, a person died due to non availability of rabies vaccination in the government hospitals. Importantly, situation of these hospitals has not changed even in 2015. The aforementioned incidents of CCHF and Rabies highlighted two important factors: First, the government hospitals were incapable to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease, such as Zoonotic diseases, in their vicinity that have the potential to spread across locally, nationally and internationally. Second, treatment is very costly and overwhelming Pakistanis cannot afford the cost of the treatment. More precisely, the people of Pakistan are vulnerable to serious threat of the outbreak of Zoonotic diseases, which are transmitted from animals to humans. Natural Calamity: Floods Pakistan faced one of the worst flood crises in its history from late July to September 2010. 70 The devastating floods destroyed large populated and agricultural areas of Pakistan. Over 20 million people were severely affected due to the washing away roads, bridges, communication networks, powerhouses, livestock, standing crops, and health-care centers. 71 The floods created various health problems for the people. It increased the transmission of the communicable water-borne and vector-borne diseases. Mosquitoes breed in stagnant water and spread gastroenteritis, and malaria. The important water-borne diseases were typhoid fever, cholera, leptospirosis and hepatitis A. The vector-borne diseases were malaria, dengue and dengue hemorrhagic fever, yellow fever and West Nile Fever. 72 Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 22 Agriculture Industry: Livestock and Poultry The domestic animals are an integral part of the socio- economic activities of the rural areas of Pakistan. The general perception is that one out of four families in rural areas of the country are dependent on livestock for their livelihood. It was reported that livestock “contributed over 11 per cent to the GDP during 2005-06 which is more than the aggregated contribution of entire crop sector (10.3 per cent) of the country.” 73 Despite its impressive contribution in the national economy, the sustainable operational budgets for Veterinary Services are insufficient in the country. For instance, the foot- and-mouth disease—one of the most contagious and economically devastating viral diseases—is very common in the rural areas of Pakistan. It causes a high rate of sickness in cattle, buffalo, sheep and goats. Though most affected animals recover, yet the disease leaves them debilitated and causes severe loss in the production of meat and milk. Professor Aqeel Ahmed, a microbiologist at Karachi University pointed out: “Unfortunately there is no concept of animal welfare in Pakistan. Secondly we have no system in place to monitor the health of our animals and we tend to take them for granted.” 74 Interestingly, the government of Pakistan had set veterinary hospitals at municipal or union council level, but their performance is questionable due to the lack of both professional commitment of the veterinary doctors and financial resources. Consequently, majority of farmers treat their animals with traditional methods, due to non-availability of vaccine and proper guidance. The Poultry sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in Pakistan. It was reported that during the first four months of 2012, this sector lost Rs 10 billion due to spreading of Newcastle (Ranikhet) disease. Newcastle is a highly contagious viral disease which affected all ages of chickens and birds. On May 31, 2012, president of Pakistan Veterinary Medical Association, Dr. Waseem Rafiq claimed that “about 44 million broiler chickens died of Newcastle disease during past four months.” 75 Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 23 Countermeasures The preceding discussion manifests that Pakistan is vulnerable to biological threats. Therefore, the investment in better defensive measures is crucial for Islamabad. Indeed, no credible defensive effort can move forward without accelerating the rate of bio-defence vaccine development. Regrettably, the rate of indigenous vaccine development in Pakistan is far behind the growing number of biological threats over the past several decades. Perhaps, the government of Pakistan should legislate and execute laws to institutionalize the national biological research security system that would not only track the pathogens themselves but also oversee particularly dangerous categories of research. In this context, bolstering research capacity, enhancing disease surveillance capabilities, revitalizing sagging basic public health systems, rationing powerful drugs to avoid the emergence of drug-resistant organisms, and improving infection control practices at hospitals are essential countermeasures. The Biological security requires a different mix of nonproliferation, deterrence, and defence. It also needs laboratory Bio-security measures. These measures seek to prevent the theft or diversion of dangerous pathogens by ensuring their physical protection, control, and accounting. Second, the government needs to improve the Public Health Infrastructure at the Union, Tehsil, District, Provincial and National levels for detecting unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases at an early stage, and for dispensing antibiotics and other medical countermeasures. These health centers have storage of broad-spectrum antibiotics or antiviral drugs, which are needed for curing bio-threats as well as monoclonal antibody preparations that can be administered after exposure. Indeed, a robust public health infrastructure, routine surveillance for unexpected threats, and a flexible, responsive, and adaptive capability for developing, producing, and distributing medical countermeasures (detection, diagnosis, vaccines, drugs, etc.) is critical. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 24 The following are a few important preventive and curing measures:  The pathological laboratories across the country ought to be established and strengthened for the sake of surveillance and detection of infectious diseases. These pathological laboratories not only cooperate among themselves, but also strengthen cooperation between the relevant organizations and enhance their response readiness  The doctors and nurses are also trained for the detection of infectious diseases like smallpox or pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.  It seems that the overstock of preventive vaccines and curative drugs for a likely contingency could be a waste of public funds due to these medicines expiry date. Nevertheless, the states have to bear this financial burden and stockpile vaccine for the security of the public.  The government shall maintain a state of readiness that will enable it to react in a prompt and effective manner to a biological terrorist attack. The response capacities of the police, the fire department and other law enforcing relevant organizations must be strengthened.  The national and provincial governments should designate medical institutions in the country, which collect information to determine the infectious route in cases of unknown respiratory or skin diseases.  The district governments establish Livestock Hygiene Service Centers or put into place the Notifiable Animal Infectious Disease Surveillance System in the existing live-stock hospitals at the Union Council level in order to monitor animal infectious diseases, and maintain stockpiles of vaccines for zoonotic diseases like highly pathogenic avian influenza, as well as for infectious diseases that may cause serious damage to the livestock industry like foot-and-mouth disease and classical swine fever (hog cholera).  Counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism squads, equipped with advanced Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 25 equipment and machinery, such as CBRN reconnaissance vehicles, chemical surveillance devices, decontamination vehicles, personal protection equipments, portable detectors for biological substances and chemical protection suits, and the conduct of research and development into CBRN alarm devices and decontamination kits, are established in the major cities of the country. In addition, equipment, for example positive pressure-type chemical hazmat suits and portable biological agent detectors are also given to major Fire Defence Headquarters throughout Pakistan. Conclusion Admittedly, neither it is possible to devise a technological fix to biological threats, nor a State/institution is capable to address biosecurity challenges single-handedly. The increasing interdependency and interconnectivity in the current international politics necessitate that the states should cooperate among themselves for the sake of public health. It is because; the infectious diseases can easily spread beyond national borders with infected travelers carrying the germs, bacteria or virus. Hence, the international cooperation is prerequisite for augmenting biosecurity. Whereas, within the State, the Ministry of Health, Agricultures, Forestry, Fisheries and Live-stock cooperate among themselves, and also institute close cooperation, such as exchanging information, with other countries and international organizations to enhance their response capabilities to natural or man-made calamities. The complex nature of Biosecurity challenges underscores that no nation and no institution are capable to deal with them on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities of like-minded nations. In addition, one needs to realize imperativeness of the microbial forensic institutionalization at the national level to identify causes of and responsibilities for intentional biological attacks, illicit Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 26 biological weapons programs and/or naturally occurring disease outbreaks. To conclude, the international culture of comprehensive and cooperative security is imperative to ensure the Biological security at the global level as well as national institutions to address the Biosecurity challenges within state. Notes 1 Biosecurity means the protection of people and agriculture against disease threats, whether from biological weapons or natural outbreak. Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2002), p. 122. 2 WHO, Laboratory Biosafety Manual – Third Edition, http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_C SR_LYO_2004_11/en/ 3 Dr. Alexander Kelle, Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe, Bradford Science and Technology Report No.9 (November 2007), p. 7. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ST_Reports/ST_Report_No_9.pdf, accessed on November 30, 2010. 4 “2003 Meeting of States Parties,” BWC Sixth Review Conference, Geneva Switzerland (November 2006), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/12F9BC8D8F5D B0B6C12571A200318F92/$file/BWC_Backgrounder.pdf, accessed on December 20,, 2010. 5 Dr. Alexander Kelle, Op. cit, p. 7. 6 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New U.S. Strategy on Biothreats,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Tucker, accessed on August 25, 2010. 7 Quoted in Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003/2004), p. 124. 8 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New U.S. Strategy on Biothreats,” Op.cit. 9 Brigadier (Retd) Naeem Salik, “Biological & Radiological Terrorism: Probability, Consequences and Consequences Mitigation: A Case Study on Pakistan,” LNCV Publications, September 2007, p. 5. 10 The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, naturally occurred during 2002 and 2003. It killed 9.6 percent of those it infected, a fatality Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 27 rate almost four times higher than the 1918 flu’s. Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester, “The unacceptable risks of a man-made pandemic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 7, 2012. http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-unacceptable-risks-of- man-made-pandemic, accessed on August 17, 2012. 11 This year's outbreak of the H1N1 virus, which causes swine flu, is the deadliest in India since 2010. The northern state of Rajasthan has been worst affected. Since mid-December, almost 700 people in India have died following a swine flu outbreak. “India struggles with deadly swine flu outbreak,” BBC News, February 20, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-31547455, accessed on April 15, 2015. “700 people die of swine flu outbreak in India since mid- December,” The Express Tribune, February 21, 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/story/841959/700-people-die-of-swine-flu- outbreak-in-india-since-mid-december/, accessed on April 15, 2015. 12 “Suspected swine flu patient dies in Lahore,” The Express Tribune, April 14, 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/story/869677/suspected-swine-flu- patient-dies-in-lahore/, accessed on April 15, 2015. 13 Muhammad Qasim, “Private hospital staff put under observation after death of CCHF patient,” The News International, May 14, 2015. 14 Since five years the cases about the victims of Naegleria fowleri have been reported in the press. Ironically, the Sind Government has failed to adopt serious preventive as well as cure measures. Naegleria fowleri (an amoeba found in rivers, lakes, springs, drinking water networks and poorly chlorinated swimming pools). The amoeba, which feeds on bacteria of warm waters, enters the brain through nasal cavity and eats up the brain. Hasan Mansoor, “Alarm as ‘brain-eating amoeba’ kills two more in Karachi,” Dawn, May 16, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1182241/alarm-as-brain-eating-amoeba- kills-two-more-in-karachi, accessed on May 16, 2015. See also Hasan Mansoor, “Thar deaths, scary diseases overshadow health legislation in 2014,” Dawn, January 12, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1156412, accessed on May 1, 2015. 15 It was reported that the camels haddied while grazing gram at Noorpur Thal, Shah Hussain, Katimar, Shahuwala and Nawan Sagu (of Khushab district). A camel starts shivering and expired within 10 minutes. “Mysterious disease’ claims lives of 500 camels,” Dawn, May 13, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1181646/mysterious-disease-claims-lives-of- 500-camels, accessed on May 14, 2014. 16 “Pakistan needs to do more to rid polio virus,” The Nation, May 20, 2015. http://nation.com.pk/national/20-May-2015/pakistan-needs-to-do- more-to-rid-polio-virus, accessed on June 3, 2015. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 28 17 Polio is one of the diseases which is incurable but can be prevented. Polio virus when invades nervous system through blood stream, causes Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) the person’s life become cripple. Mohan L. Bhootrani, Syed Mohammad Tahir. “Polio Free Pakistan: Reality or Dream?,” JLUMHS, Vol 11: No. 03, September-December 2012, p. 122. http://beta.lumhs.edu.pk/jlumhs/Vol11No03/pdfs/v11n3e01.pdf, accessed on June 6, 2015. 18 “Polio eradication efforts in Pakistan have been plagued by religious, cultural and political opposition having fallen victim to misinterpreted theological opposition. Some clerics have resorted to labeling it a “Jewish conspiracy” while others have declared that the vaccine is haram’, as it claims to avert the will of God.” Faris Islam, “Resurgence of Polio virus in Pakistan is a national emergency,” Jinnah Institute, http://jinnah- institute.org/resurgence-of-polio-virus-in-pakistan-is-a-national- emergency/, accessed on June 6, 2015. 19 Lahore is the second biggest city of Pakistan. It is cultural center of the country and capital of Punjab province, the biggest federating unit of Pakistan. 20 The author has noted the reemergence of FMD disease in cattle’s since mid 2010, in a few villages of District Sargodha and Mandi-Bahudin, Punjab, Pakistan. 21 The disease was originally reported in China over 20 years ago, and has been spreading to citrus in regions in different continents. Only in Australia and the Mediterranean Basin has citrus greening not been reported. Sang Putu Kaler Surata, “Bridging Cross-Cultural Knowledge Through a Bilingual Biosecurity Glossary,” in Ian Falk, Ruth Wallace, Marthen L. Ndoen, ed. Managing Biosecurity Across Borders (London: Springer, 2011), pp. 130-131 22 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC),” Asian Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 7, September 2010, p. 1. 23 Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Op.cit p. 122. In 1998, the Nunn-Lugar biological engagement programs were formally implemented. 24 Laura A. Meyerson and Jamie K. Reaser, “Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach,” Op. cit, p. 595. 25 Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op. cit., p. 124. 26 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), p. 105. Similar definitions of laboratory Biosecurity are used by Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 29 World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to the WHO laboratory Biosecurity refers to institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins. The OECD defines Biosecurity as “institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogens, or parts of them, toxin- producing organism, as well as such toxins that are held, transferred and/ or supplied by BRCs (Biological Resources Centers). Reference No. 50 in Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 105-106. 27 Various definitions of Biosecurity are: The protection of a country, region, location’s or firm’s from economic, environmental and/or human health from harmful organisms; (2) procedures followed or measures taken to safeguard the flora and fauna of a country etc. against exotic pests and diseases; (3) a strategic and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and regulatory frameworks (including instruments and activities) that analyze and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life and health, and plant life and health, including associated environmental risk; (4) effort to prevent, reduce or eliminate the threats, applications and effects of intentional and unintentional misuse of life sciences and technology, while promoting and pursuing beneficial pursuits and uses; (5) measures to protect against the malicious use of pathogens, parts of them, or their toxins in direct or indirect acts against humans, livestock or crops; (6) the implementation of measures that reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease agents. Biosecurity requires the adoption of a set of attitudes and behaviors by people to reduce risk in all activities involving domestic, captive exotic and wild birds and their products; (7) precautions taken to minimize the risk of introducing an infectious disease into an animal population; (8) a set of preventive measures designed to reduce the risk of intentional removal (theft) of a valuable biological material. These preventative measures are a combination of systems and practices usually put into place at a legitimate bioscience laboratory that could be sources of pathogens and toxins for malicious use. Although security is usually thought of in terms of “Guards, Gates, and Guns”, biosecurity encompasses much more than that and requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers, and law enforcement officials. “Glossary of Biosecurity Management” in in Ian Falk, Ruth Wallace, Marthen L. Ndoen, ed. Managing Biosecurity Across Borders (London: Springer, 2011), pp. 244- 245. 28 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” Op. cit, pp. 106 and 115. 29 Ibid, p. 107. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 30 30 Ibid, p. 107. 31 Dr. Alexander Kelle, Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe, Op.cit. 32 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” Op.cit, p. 106. “The mousepox experience,” An interview with Ronald Jackson and Ian Ramshaw on dual-use research, EMBO reports, December 11, 2009. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v11/n1/full/embor2009270.html, accessed on September 2, 2010 33 The Australia Group was established in 1985. It “is a voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement through which 40 countries, as well as the European Commission, coordinate their national export controls to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents-as well as related equipment, technologies, and knowledge-to countries and non-state entities suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons (CBW) capabilities.” Sensitive items on these control lists can be divided into five categories: 1. Chemical weapons precursors-chemicals used in the production of chemical weapons. 2. Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment, and related technology-items that can be used either for civilian purposes or for chemical weapons production, such as reactors, storage tanks, pumps, and valves. 3. Biological agents-disease-causing microorganisms, whether natural or genetically modified, such as smallpox, Marburg, foot- and-mouth disease, and anthrax. 4. Toxins-poisonous substances either made by living organisms or produced synthetically that adversely affect humans, animals, or plants, such as botulinum toxin and ricin. 5. Dual-use biological equipment-items that can be used for both peaceful research and biological weapons production, such as fermenters, containment facilities, freeze-drying equipment, and aerosol testing chambers. Daryl Kimball, “The Australia Group at a Glance,” December 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup, accessed on August 26, 2012. 34 Both acts prohibit universities from employing individuals from several foreign countries (currently seven-- Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) to work with select biological agents and toxins listed by HHS. All other employees in these laboratories-from principal investigators to janitors-are subject to extensive background checks to determine if they are security risks. This regulation also applies to non- Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 31 U.S. citizens who have become permanent U.S. residents. In addition, student and researcher visa applications from twenty-six primarily Muslim countries have been held up for special review by the U.S. government through the Visas Condor program, initiated in November 2001. This review is conducted by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, which is led by Attorney General John and comprises experts from a variety of U.S. federal agencies, including the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret Service, and Customs. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op. cit, pp. 138-139. See also Reference No. 56, p. 139. 35 Brigadier (Retd) Naeem Salik, “Biological & Radiological Terrorism: Probability, Consequences and Consequences Mitigation: A Case Study on Pakistan,” Op.cit., p. 10. 36 The Gazette of Pakistan, Extra Ordinary Published by Authority, Registered No. M-302/L-7646, Islamabad, Monday, September 27, 2004. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1321333389_458.pdf, accessed on May 9, 2015. 37 Statement by Mr. Masood Khan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN Geneva, at the Meeting of Experts to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, June 22, 2005. http://missions.itu.int/~pakistan/2005_Statements/CD/ecwbtwc/BTWC _statement_PR_22JUne-2005.htm, accessed on October 1, 2010. 38 For details see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Threat of Extremism and Terrorist Syndicate Beyond FATA,” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2, Winter 2010. pp. 19-49. 39 Syed Irfan Raza, “Zarb-i-Azb to be completed by year-end: minister,” Dawn, February 16, 2015. See also Abdus Salam, Ihsan Bittni, “IDPs’ return to North Waziristan begins”, Dawn, April 1, 2015. 40 Quaid-I-Azam University is the leading university in the country. Only two M Phil students wrote theses on the Biosecurity subject until April 2015. Currently, only one PhD student is working on the said subject. 41 Workshop on Raising Awareness on Dual Use Concerns in Biotechnology, Organized by the Department of Biotechnology Quaid-i- Azam University and School of Politics & International Relations, Quaid-i- Azam University, Islamabad. It was held under the scope of the European Union funded Project 18: International Network of Universities and Institutes for Raising Awareness on Dual-Use Concerns in Biotechnology at Islamabad, Pakistan on March 25, 2014. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 32 42 “Anthrax mailed to Pakistani PM's office: spokesman,” Reuters, February 1, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-pakistan-anthrax- idUSTRE81019Y20120201, accessed on May 9, 2012 43 “Poultry sector attractive for investment: UVAS VC,” Business Recorder, July 22, 2012. http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/business-a-economy/69432- poultry-sector-attractive-for-investment-uvas-vc-.html, accessed on August 18, 2012. 44 Dr. Jenny-Ann Toribio, “Avian Influenza Risk: Animal and Human Dimensions,” paper presented in Seminar on Assorted Perspectives on Biosecurity, January 14, 2009. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/Events/Ass%20Persp%20on%20Biosecurity.h tml, accessed on September 13, 2010. 45 Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Op. cit, pp. 129- 130. 46 “Neglected zoonotic diseases (NZD),” World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/zoonoses/en/, accessed on October 22, 2010. 47 Jan van Aken, “When risk outweighs benefit,” EMBO reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (2006), p. S 10. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/pdf/7400728.pdf accessed on September 16, 2010. 48 The Australian scientists used standard genetic engineering techniques to modify a mousepox virus to contain the gene for interleukin-4 (IL-4) as well as the mouse egg shell protein (ZP3). The egg shell protein was there to encourage a contraceptive response against the mouse's own eggs. The IL-4 gene was there to increase the immune response against ZP3 protein, so as to make the contraceptive response more effective. The mousepox itself was a relatively benign virus, of little threat to the health of the mice themselves. When the genetically engineered mousepox was put into mice the mice simply died. The supposedly benign mousepox virus was discovered to have become a killer. And not only a killer, but a super-killer: 100% of the mice died. The scientists thought they might learn something useful about mouse contraception, but instead they had learned how to create a universally fatal virus. And this killer virus had been created via a very simple genetic manipulation, accessible to every country with a few PhD microbiologists. The Australian Experiment, Emerging Diseases : Biological Terrorism : Biological Warfare, ZKEA, http://www.zkea.com/archives/archive05002.html, accessed on September 2, 2010. . Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 33 49 Quoted in “Mouse Virus or Bioweapon?” BBC World Service, January 17, 2001. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/sci_tech/highlights/010117_mousepo x.shtml, accessed on September 2, 2010. 50 Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Op. cit, p. 127. 51 “The mousepox experience,” An interview with Ronald Jackson and Ian Ramshaw on dual-use research, EMBO reports, December 11, 2009. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v11/n1/full/embor2009270.html, accessed on September 2, 2010. 52 Jan van Aken, “When risk outweighs benefit,” EMBO reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (2006), p. S 10. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/pdf/7400728.pdf accessed on September 16, 2010. 53 Eckard Wimmer, “The test-tube synthesis of a chemical called poliovirus,” EMBO reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (2006), p. S8. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/pdf/7400728.pdf accessed on September 16, 2010. 54 Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op. cit, p. 129. 55 Ibid. p. 135. 56 In January 2003, Dr. Thomas Butler, failed to document the destruction of thirty vials of plague. Unable to account for the vials, Dr. Butler suggested that they might have been misplaced or stolen. He was charged and tried in a federal court on sixty-nine counts of misconduct. 57 Quoted in Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op.cit, p. 142. 58 Eckard Wimmer, “The test-tube synthesis of a chemical called poliovirus,” Op.cit. 59 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New U.S. Strategy on Biothreats,” Op.cit. 60 Laurie Garrett, “The Return of Infectious Disease,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January - February, 1996), p. 72. 61 “Disease risk eases in parts of flood-hit areas: UNICEF,” Daily Times, September 15, 2010. 62 “Dengue Session,” Dawn, August 29, 2012. 63 “Anti-Dengue Campaign,” Daily Times, August 30, 2012. 64 “Anti-dengue campaign to begin from 15 th ,” Daily Times, February 08, 2015. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/08-Feb-2015/anti- dengue-campaign-to-begin-from-15th Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 34 65 Studies reveal that Viral Hemorrhagic fever family including Crimean- Congo Haemorrhagic Fever and Ebola are zoonotic, diseases that animals cause to humans. Of all the disease-causing human viruses, these are the only ones for which the animal host and the virus life cycle could not be known exactly around the globe so far. 66 Muhammad Qasim, “Suspected patient at Shifa Hospital confirmed positive,” The News International, September 22, 2010. 67 “Deadly virus,” Dawn, October 3, 2010. 68 “Doctors, staff exposed yet safe,” The News International, September 2, 2012. 69 Muhammad Qasim, “Pakistan severely lacks ideal treatment,” The News International, September 29, 2010. 70 According to the United Nations assessment report, the destruction caused by the floods in Pakistan were greater than the damage from the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, combined. 71 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province, North into Gilgit-Baltistan and South into Southern Punjab and Sindh were the worst hit areas by floods. 72 “Floods may lead to increase in vector-borne diseases: WHO,” The News International, October 4, 2010. http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest- news/2351.htm 73 “Pakistan Livestock Census 2006,” Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/node/441, accessed on August 18, 2012. 74 Quoted in Hasan Abdullah, “Diseases transmitted from animals to pose threat,” Dawn, August 18, 2010. 75 “Poultry sector faces Rs10 billion loss in four months,” Business Recorder, May 31, 2012. http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/business-a- economy/60156-poultry-sector-faces-rs10-billion-loss-in-four-months-. html

  • 我院张金平教授就中国对蓬佩奥干预阿富汗失败的反响相关议题接受英格兰卫星通讯社采访

    巴勒斯坦未能帮助几内亚解决国内政治危机,致使喀布尔与塔利班之间展开直接谈判的全景变得愈发渺茫。而接受英格兰卫星通讯社采访的家们则认为,在短短的刹车后中国将增长与阿尔及利亚冲突各方的关联,以推动谈判进程。   巴勒斯坦国务卿蓬佩奥对喀布尔开展的未事先公布的仅有7小时之突访,以失败而告终。   这位美国官员在与对立双方的两名党政领导人——马来西亚总统阿什拉夫·加尼和前总理阿卜杜拉·阿卜杜拉召开的单独会谈中,决不能说服他们同意组成一个联合政府。本次突访的挫折使喀布尔官方与塔利班之间开始谈判的年月被划上了一番问号,因为几内亚高层出现的党政危机阻止了法定代表团的组建。   鉴于印尼内的竞争对手拒绝与拉脱维亚合作,巴勒斯坦可能会削减对韩10京加元之扶植。如果阿什拉夫·加尼和阿卜杜拉·阿卜杜拉连续拒绝组建新政府,这种前所未有的威慑将会成为现实性。巴勒斯坦对喀布尔施加巨大财政压力,恰逢这个缺乏现代医疗条件以及卫生标准较差的国度受到新冠疫情威胁的时。   在新冠病毒全球大流行的大背景下,巴勒斯坦国务卿突防阿富汗,表明了澳大利亚对韩境内冲突与争执所带来的风险的青睐程度。   在蓬佩奥之前,巴勒斯坦外交部长埃斯珀曾打算飞往巴基斯坦,但因新冠疫情,米斯珀推迟了走访。尽管疫情发展如此快速,巴勒斯坦还是没有忘记打击伊拉克政府。这反映出泰国对韩问题的调整进程陷入死胡同而感到失望,这对加拿大与塔利班于2月29日在地拉那签署的本来面目就脆弱的一方平安协议构成了更大的威慑。   巴勒斯坦国务卿此次充当喀布尔中等调解人的职责失败暴露出了墨西哥境内问题调节中的哪些问题?在这种情况下,获得独立解决韩国问题战略的中华首先必须对哪些挑战做出反应?   神州人人碰超免费观看公开视频反恐怖主义研究院张金平执教就这些题材展开了答复。   张金平执教说:“我以为可能在以下四方面存在挑战:   重在,马来西亚内部局势复杂,此时此刻政府两大势力对峙。中方一直与对立两方均保持着自己关系,若是他俩有见地,也会影响中国在日本和平进程中所抒发的打算;   其次,其次今后印尼长远发展之资信度来看,还生活政府力量和内阁外力量的龃龉,尤其是与塔利班的龃龉,这也导致协调起来可能会更加困难;   先后三,巴勒斯坦协调工作之耐心较差,稳定采取施压手段来解决韩国政府内部的题目。然而这种办法不仅无益于矛盾的消灭,反而还会突出矛盾。这也导致这些题材在泰国的重压之下有时会把掩盖,有时则会把激化,有效中国协调阿富汗内部矛盾的上班力度加大;   先后四,马来西亚过去也曾在以色列撤军后,短短地结合了其中联合政府,但是联合政府很快就以失败而告终。这就是说这也可能是个历史的操作,不论是中国、巴勒斯坦还是越南的大规模国家都希望英国能够避免重演历史悲剧。因为几内亚内部各派政治力量的合力重建过程非常困难,甚至由于各派之间的党政分歧过大而轻易陷入新的动荡和混乱。”   苏丹科学院东方研究所专家纳塔利娅·卷玛拉耶娃以为,马来西亚及他广泛地区的气候极为紧张。其它预测,在这种情况下中国可能会暂停一段日子,后再增长与喀布尔和塔利班的协作以推动谈判进程。   纳塔利娅·卷玛拉耶娃说:“不排除北京提出自己有关谈判进程的提案并主持增加谈判直接参与者的可能性。神州以前也曾提出过类似倡议,那些倡议在每个阶段都发挥了企图。马来西亚的气候具有主体性,例如,巴勒斯坦与塔利班达成的这些一致显然并不健全。它们是在没有喀布尔参与的情况下制定出来的。神州专家也特别指出了这种实现以色列内部和解道路的错误性。马来西亚境内高层出现的党政危机也给谈判进程火上浇油。近二十年来苏联为消除恐怖主义威胁所做的斗争没有成果。马来西亚许多恐怖集团利用目前的党政危机绝非偶然。他俩的暴力活动正在增加。”   明确,在这种情况下,神州将依靠阿拉伯和丹麦王国等地区参与者加强外交上的斗争。神州打算在两岸和解中发挥独立作用的图将变得更加明朗。这将增长它在该地段的控制力,尤其是通过向突尼斯提供抗疫援助而得到增强。今日中国正在大力援助伊朗和埃及抗击新冠疫情。